to reject Mayor Beame's request for financial assistance, Treasury Secretary William Simon stressed the political dimensions of his recommendation. Any assistance, he said, should be on terms "so punitive, the overall experience made so painful, that no city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same road. 9(p259) To avert bankruptcy and restore stability, city and state
IN THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S,
New York City experienced epidemics of tuberculosis (TB), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, and homicide. Although each of these has unique determinants and each affects people worldwide, in New York City the 3 epidemics played out in a specific geographic, temporal, and political context; affected similar populations; and together contributed to a public health crisis. [1] [2] [3] HIV infection, TB, and homicide constituted a syndemic that affected New York City from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. A syndemic has been defined as 2 or more epidemics, with biological determinants and social conditions interacting synergistically, that contribute to an excess burden of disease in a population. 4, 5 We used journalistic accounts and government reports, as well as recent epidemiological and economic analyses, to examine how budget and policy decisions made in New York City in the 1970s contributed to the increasing incidence of TB, HIV infection, and homicide during the | Nicholas Freudenberg, DrPH, Marianne Fahs, PhD, Sandro Galea, MD, DrPH, and Andrew Greenberg, MS
In 1975, New York City experienced a fiscal crisis rooted in long-term political and economic changes in the city. Budget and policy decisions designed to alleviate this fiscal crisis contributed to the subsequent epidemics of tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, and homicide in New York City. Because these conditions share underlying social determinants, we consider them a syndemic, i.e., all 3 combined to create an excess disease burden on the population. Cuts in services; the dismantling of health, public safety, and social service infrastructures; and the deterioration of living conditions for vulnerable populations contributed to the amplification of these health conditions over 2 decades.
We estimate that the costs incurred in controlling these epidemics exceeded $50 billion (in 2004 dollars); in contrast, the overall budgetary saving during the fiscal crisis was $10 billion. This history has implications for public health professionals who must respond to current perceptions of local fiscal crises. 1980s and 1990s. Municipal, state, and federal policy and budget decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s determined the severity of the syndemic and contributed to tens of thousands of preventable deaths and illnesses. Ultimately, it cost New York City tens of billions of dollars to deal with the consequences of these budget cuts. We hoped that an examination of this chapter of the city's history and the longer-term social and economic costs of the policy decisions made in that era would yield lessons that could guide the public health response to future municipal fiscal crises.
MUNICIPAL RESPONSE TO THE 1975 FISCAL CRISIS
Beginning in 1975, a fiscal and political crisis left New York City without the resources to pay its operating expenses or the ability to borrow money from public credit markets, banks, or the federal government. This fiscal crisis was rooted in global economic changes (a worldwide recession and oil shortages); federal, state, The cumulative effect of these cuts significantly reduced the scope of municipal services. In the 7 years before 1975, city spending had risen 30% in real dollars; in the next 7 years it fell by 33%. 10 These reductions in the scope of government sent an important political message. Felix Rohatyn, an investment banker and a chief architect of the EFCB, noted that as a consequence of the cuts in municipal services, "the direction and philosophy of a large unit of government were fundamentally and permanently changed as a result of the involvement (some would say intrusion) of the private sector in government." 20(p157) 
FEDERAL BUDGET DECISIONS
Beginning in the mid-1970s but especially after the election of a conservative president in 1980, the federal government also initiated a series of budget, tax, and social policy decisions that adversely affected the population of New York City and other cities. For example, by 1982 federal support for low-income housing had all but ended, 22 and federal funding for urban development and public health problems such as TB, sexually transmitted infections, and mental health was reduced and consolidated into "block grants," that gave states the flexibility to shift resources into more politically popular programs. 23 General revenue sharing was ended in 1985, and between 1980 and 1990 federal support for the Community Development Block Grant program, an important source for economic and infrastructure support for low-income neighborhoods, was slashed from $6.1 to $2.8 billion. 24 Generous tax cuts for the wealthy and big increases in military spending further reduced federal resources for health and social problems and contributed to a political climate that favored shrinking government. 25 As new problems such as AIDS, crack addiction, and a rising rate of homicide emerged, state and local governments were increasingly unable to turn to the national government for help. The lessons that Treasury Secretary Simon and banker Rohatyn had hoped to teach had taken hold.
CHANGES IN LIVING CONDITIONS
As a result of broader social and economic changes such as deindustrialization and loss of manufacturing jobs, suburbanization, 2 economic recessions, [26] [27] [28] and the previously described municipal and federal policy decisions, living conditions for the city's low-income population deteriorated significantly. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of poor people in New York City increased by 20% even as the city's population declined by 10%. 29 Arson and other fires, gentrification, suburbanization, and landlords' abandonment of buildings contributed, in different ways, to the displacement of nearly one quarter of the city's population.
2,30
Job losses and cuts in public benefits combined to reduce family income, and housing costs increased. By 1980, a freeze on public assistance imposed by the New York State legislature in 1975 had reduced the inflationadjusted value of the average welfare grant by 50%, 31 89% of patients discharged from Harlem Hospital, which served the district with the city's highest TB rates, were lost to follow-up or failed to complete treatment. Concomitantly, New York City experienced a subepidemic of multidrug-resistant TB, which increased from 10% of reported cases in 1983 to 23% in 1991. 36 Contributing to the resurgence of TB were the fiscal crisis reductions in safety-net programs such as public assistance and Medicaid  PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW  and the post-1980 reductions in federal support for low-income housing that pushed many people into homelessness. 38 Between 1982 and 1992, the city's homeless population grew from 7584 to 23 494, 36 forcing many people into the city's homeless shelters and jails, settings associated with TB transmission. 39, 40 Earlier cuts in hospital services led to overcrowded and understaffed hospitals, which also contributed to TB transmission. 41 Finally, the HIV/AIDS epidemic also coincided with TB resurgence. The combination of an increase in the number of HIV-infected people whose compromised immunity made them more vulnerable to reactivation of TB and to new infection 36 and the rise in overcrowded living conditions that increase the probability of airborne infection illustrates the link between biological and social factors that is characteristic of a syndemic. 4 
HIV Infection
Most researchers believe that HIV infection first appeared in New York during the 1970s and spread rapidly among men who had sex with men and injection drug users, first, and then, throughout the 1980s, to the wider sexual and drug networks of these populations. 42 By the mid-1970s, the relative efficacy of methadone in reducing drug use and associated criminal activity had been established. 50 Later research showed that participation in methadone maintenance programs or harm reduction programs also decreased new HIV infections substantially. 51 19 The relationships between policing and crime are complex, but the dismantling of substantial portions of the police department without implementation of other public safety programs contributed to a cycle of escalating crime and decreasing community capacity to control criminal behavior. Most observers agree that the development of crack cocaine in the early 1980s contributed significantly to the increasing level of violence in New York City. 58, 59 Crack use spread quickly in the homeless shelters. In addition, high rates of youth unemployment caused by the recession of the early 1980s and federal cuts in job training programs provided the crack industry with a ready, willing, and able marketing force of young people. Cuts in youth and job training programs put more young people on the street, where they were more vulnerable to the street culture of crime and violence. By the mid-1980s, crack was available on many 34 Data for homicide obtained from Langan and Durose. 35 Data for TB, AIDS, and homicide were scaled by 1985 (median year of interval of interest) incidence rate for ease of comparison. Therefore, the yaxis represents the incidence rate for a given year compared with the 1985 incidence rate; a y-axis measure of more than 1 suggests incidence higher than 1985, and a measure of less than 1 suggests lower incidence than 1985.
low-income street corners, which dealers would protect using high-caliber automatic weapons to discourage competition, further contributing to the violence. 60, 61 In summary, a variety of policy decisions made during the fiscal crisis and thereafter contributed to the TB, HIV, and homicide syndemic that peaked in the mid1990s (Figure 1) . The actions taken to achieve a structural adjustment of the city's budget by balancing revenues and expenses had the unintended consequence of imposing new burdens on the city's poorest residents. Although each of the 3 epidemics had its own dynamics, city, state, and federal decisions about drug treatment, primary health care, and housing worsened all 3, and the policy-driven deterioration in living conditions expanded the size of the populations most vulnerable to these health problems.
ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE SYNDEMIC
In the last half of the 20th century, public health economists applied principles of neoclassical theory linking population health and economic productivity 62, 63 to develop cost-of-illness methodologies. These multidisciplinary methods are used to measure economic consequences of illness in society. [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] On the basis of this literature, we extended our analysis of the New York City syndemic to obtain a partial estimate of its cumulative economic consequences. We obtained an indication of the order of magnitude of the syndemic's economic burden to society [70] [71] [72] [73] by applying published cost-of-illness estimates developed during the New York City syndemic to the incidence rates illustrated in Table 1 .
Our economic estimates for TB and HIV infection included the direct costs associated with treating that proportion of illness represented by the post-fiscal crisis increase in rates. For deaths because of homicide and AIDS, we included the economic value attributed to lost life. 74, 75 Our estimates were based on economic cost-of-illness studies using nationally representative samples. [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] When possible, we adjusted for temporally specific New York City differences, using published sources. For instance, to better reflect the way in which New York City used resources during the TB epidemic, we adjusted national cost estimates to take into account the increased expenditures for TB cases resulting from directly observed therapy in New York City. 80 For HIV, we adjusted drug costs to take into account the new antiretroviral therapies that began to become available in the early 1990s. 81 We adjusted all estimates to 2004 dollars, using the medical services component and the New York regional component of the US consumer price index for urban wage earners.
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For TB, we considered cases reported between 1979, the year TB incidence began to rise, and 1999, the year it fell below the 1978 rate. In these 20 years, 47 105 new cases of TB were reported in New York City. Had the TB incidence rate observed between 1974 and 1978 persisted, an estimated 10 717 fewer cases HIV cost of illness estimates are updated and modified from Hellinger's estimates to include changes in the standards of care from no antiretrovirals or ziduvudine monotherapy from 1987-1991 to HIV prophylaxis which included combination antiretroviral medications. We chose the most conservative economic estimate of prophylaxis combination therapy, Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxacaole and Azithromycin. We did not include Fluconazole nor the highly costly Gangciclovar. Thus our estimates are likely highly conservative. While HIV prophylaxis changed after Hellinger's study, survival was not yet significantly affected, so we did not make survival modifications to Hellinger's study. e We used national estimates through 1988, and used New York city-specific cost data from 1989 on, to reflect highly resource-intensive directly-observed therapy practices in effect.
would have been reported. We calculated the costs of these cases, a conservative estimate: had the TB rate continued to decline after 1978 as in previous decades, an estimated 20 000 to 52 000 cases would have been averted. 36, 80 For homicide, we considered the number of deaths between 1979, the year rates began to increase sharply, and 1993, the year they returned to the 1978 level. In this interval, 26 890 people were murdered, 3265 more deaths than would have occurred had the homicide rate in the 1974 through 1978 period persisted.
Because HIV infection arose in New York City at about the same time as the fiscal crisis, 43 we could not attribute a specific component of illness to the social climate of that period by comparing pre-and post-fiscal crisis AIDS case rates. Therefore, we used published estimates of the proportion of cases that could have been averted had robust prevention programs been established in the early 1980s, when AIDS was first recognized as an epidemic. Reports reviewing the efficacy of HIV prevention interventions in the United States have shown that participation in drug treatment programs is associated with a 17% to 78% reduction in HIV prevalence, 52 and a recent international review suggests that "expanded" responses to the HIV epidemic can avert 60% to 69% of new cases. 83 We conservatively estimated that a citywide effort to expand drug treatment and harm reduction services, improve access to primary care and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, and provide more aggressive HIV prevention services might have averted 20% of the overall HIV infections and AIDS cases in New York City between 1976 and 1995. According to the DOH, at the end of 1995, 51 783 New York City residents had died of AIDS, 41 623 were estimated to be living with AIDS, 84 and about 50 000 were HIV infected but
had not yet been diagnosed with AIDS. 85 Thus, we estimate that by the end of 1995, 10 357 AIDS deaths, 8325 AIDS cases, and 10 000 HIV infections could have been averted. Applying our cost-of-illness estimates associated with these conditions, and using our conservative estimates of excess burden of morbidity and mortality, we calculated that the excess diagnosed and suspected TB cases following the New York City fiscal crisis incurred just under $500 million in direct medical costs. The higher estimates of excess cases would yield direct medical costs ranging from more than $900 million (by Frieden et al.'s estimate 80 ) to about $2.4 billion (by Paolo and Nosanchuk's estimate 36 ). We estimated the direct costs, lost productivity costs, and lostquality-of-life costs for the 3265 excess homicides to be $17.7 billion. For HIV and AIDS, the direct costs were $2.3 billion for preventable deaths, $1.8 billion for preventable cases living with AIDS, and $666 million for preventable cases of HIV infectiona total of $4.7 billion. Adding the economic value of loss of life only for AIDS deaths during our period of study adds another $31 billion to the AIDS costs. (A detailed description of our methods is available from the corresponding author.)
In summary, the costs of the excess cases of TB, the excess homicides, and the potentially preventable cases of HIV/AIDS that occurred after the New York City fiscal crisis ranged from $54.7 billion to more than $160 billion, depending on the definition of "excess" cases. In comparison, spending cuts between 1976 and 1983, when spending began to increase again, saved the city $9.9 billion (in 2004 dollars) over what it would have spent had it continued spending at the 1976 level. Thus, the costs of excess TB and homicide and preventable HIV infection alone were 5 to 15 times greater than the total dollar savings in city expenditures during the fiscal crisis.
LIMITATIONS
Several caveats are in order. First, the study of complex health problems with multiple causes seldom allows assignment of definitive causality or quantification of the burden of disease attributable to any one factor. The very concept of syndemics argues against singular causes. What made dedicated and well-trained public health professionals participate in the dismantling of vital services? Most felt that they had no choice. Elected officials ordered agency heads to make cuts. When the head of the public hospital system resisted, he was fired. 94, 95 As Brash 11 has explained, the discourse of fiscal crisis, created in New York City in the 1970s, proved to be a powerful tool for making cuts seem inevitable and resistance futile, even irresponsible. Whereas some advocates and health professionals did resist the EFCB's prescriptions, their efforts were short-lived and mostly ineffective. 9, 11 One lesson from this historical analysis is that health advocates may need to challenge the Workers at Bellevue Hospital, a New York City public hospital, protesting budget cuts in 1976. They averted one round of cuts by forgoing costof-living increases for 2 years, a giveback worth $10 million.
Reprinted with permission from the Bellevue Hospital Archives. discourse of fiscal crisis directly. In 1975, New York City and other cities did face real problems, but the decision to impose the highest costs on the most vulnerable populations was a political decision. Alternative solutions included looking for additional revenue, such as from city income tax increases or financial service surcharges; transferring some costs to higher, richer levels of government; and imposing a moratorium on interest on loans to the city. These options would have presented different economic, political, and health costs and benefits. Had advocates been more successful in forcing consideration of these options, the human costs of the fiscal crisis could have been reduced.
Perhaps the principal lesson is that if the public health community is to advocate effectively against budget and policy decisions that damage health, it will need to identify constituencies that can bring new clout into the political arena. In the late 19th and early 20th century, progressive movements, labor unions, and wealthy reformers often worked together to improve living conditions and health, in part because sectors of the elite believed such reforms enhanced stability and promoted growth. In 1975, such alliances were not strong enough to resist the EFCB's plan. 9, 11 A key challenge for health advocates today is to create broad coalitions that have the will and power to resist policies and budgets that can damage health.
Another lesson may help public health professionals join the current debate on the roles of government and markets in responding to social problems. New York City's fiscal crisis spurred the call for allowing market forces to solve social problems. Yet as the syndemic unfolded, it was the government, not market forces, that ultimately contained TB, homicide, and AIDS. TB rates began to drop in 1993 after a comprehensive DOH campaign that cost more than $1 billion. 80 Beginning in 1991, New York City began to rebuild its police force, and by 1999, the city had almost double the number of police officers employed in 1980. Homicide rates started to fall in 1991, and by 1995 they had dropped below the 1970 level. Many factors contributed to the decline in homicide, 90 but it seems likely that increased police presence was one. New cases of AIDS started to decline in 1993 after city, state, and federal programs, including the Ryan White HIV CARE Act and CDC prevention programs, made HIV prevention and new treatments available to populations hardest hit by the epidemic. 44 Once again, federal policy and broader economic changes, such as the economic prosperity of the 1990s and the growth of job opportunities in the service sector, amplified the impact of local policy decisions, although this time in a salubrious direction. The story of the public health consequences of the New York City fiscal crisis is a cautionary tale about the value of health impact assessment. In hindsight, it seems evident that freezing drug treatment programs and cutting the narcotics squad during a surge in heroin use, cutting TB services even after new cases had started to increase, and failing to act decisively against the burgeoning HIV epidemic could damage public health. It appears that because there was no mechanism that required an assessment of the impact of proposed policies and budgets on health, public officials did not adequately consider the costs and benefits of their actions. The precautionary principle suggests that public health officials have an obligation to ensure that new policies are safe rather than to count bodies after the changes have been implemented. 96 This history illustrates that budget and policy decisions have long-term and systemic consequences. It took almost 2 decades for the adverse health consequences of the fiscal crisis decisions to play out. Most elected officials do not consider the consequences of their actions beyond the election or the budget cycle. If public health professionals want to avoid future complicity in implementing health-damaging policies, we will need to find new ways to engage the public in making decisions about health. ■ 
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